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December 1984. Cancun, Mexico. A beach resort thronging with refugees
from winter—except in one hotel room, where a dozen people sit listening,
explaining, venting frustrations. They are Heini Rohrer, co-inventor of the
scanning tunneling microscope (STM), and erstwhile STMers from various
universities and corporate laboratories. Almost four years earlier, Rohrer,
Gerd Binnig, and Christoph Gerber got their STM working at the IBM lab-
oratory in Zurich, Switzerland. It took a long time to recruit new STM
builders, and even longer to get the recruits’ instruments running. Now,
things are at a breaking point. Some new STMers have been working for
two years, yet none can replicate the Zurich group’s great achievement:
images of single atoms on a silicon surface. One by one the attendees rise,
describe their machine, show some blurry images, and ask Rohrer and the
others what they’re doing wrong.
This story ends happily. By March of 1985, several groups achieved
atomic resolution of silicon and presented spectacular images to packed
crowds at the American Physical Society meeting. Within five years, these
physicists, chemists, electrical engineers, and surface scientists oversaw the
rapid expansion of tunneling microscopy and its proliferation into related
techniques such as atomic force microscopy (AFM), magnetic force micro-
scopy (MFM), and near-field scanning optical microscopy (NSOM)—
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known collectively as “probe microscopy.” Today, there are thousands of
AFMs, MFMs, and STMs at universities, national laboratories, and indus-
trial research and quality-control facilities. High school students make STMs
from Legos, while chip manufacturers use million-dollar AFMs on the fac-
tory floor. One AFM has even made it to the surface of Mars.1
Stories about scientific instruments have long been a staple for histori-
ans of science and technology. This literature was crucial in elucidating the
artifactual basis of scientific knowledge and the technological considera-
tions underlying even the “purest” research.2 These narratives, however,
have largely focused on the “pre-Cancun” phase, from invention to replica-
tion. This can be a remarkably elastic phase, since some techniques (e.g.,
mass spectrometry or the laser) draw adherents simply through the oppor-
tunities afforded to newcomers to continually invent new variants.3 A few
exemplary works, such as Nicolas Rasmussen’s history of biological elec-
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1. All scanning probe microscopes bring a very small solid probe very close (usually
to within a nanometer, which is one billionth of a meter) to a sample in order to mea-
sure the strength of different kinds of interactions between probe tip and sample to deter-
mine the height (and other characteristics) of the sample. The probe is then rastered
much like the pixels on a television screen, and a matrix of values for the strength of the
tip–sample interaction is converted into a visual “picture” of the surface. Different probe
microscopes use different kinds of tip–sample interactions to generate their images. The
first—the STM—works by putting a voltage difference between the tip and a metal or
semiconductor sample; when the tip is brought close to the sample, some electrons will
“tunnel” between them. Tunneling is a quantum mechanical process by which particles
near-instantaneously displace from one point to another across a barrier. The strength of
the current of tunneling electrons is exponentially dependent on the distance between the
STM tip and the sample; also, the stream of tunneling electrons is very narrow. Thus, an
STM has ultrahigh resolution both vertically and laterally: most STMs can actually detect
individual atoms on many samples. Today, the STM’s younger cousin, the atomic-force
microscope (AFM), is more commonly used. An AFM employs a very small but flexible
cantilever as a probe; as the tip of this cantilever (usually weighted with a small pyramid
of extra atoms) is brought close to the surface, the cantilever bends due to the attraction
or repulsion of interatomic forces between tip and sample. The degree of bending is then
a proxy for the height of the surface. Originally, this bending was measured by putting an
STM on the back of the cantilever; today, however, the deflection is detected by bouncing
a laser off the cantilever and measuring the movement of the reflected spot. Another
common and industrially relevant tool, the magnetic force microscope (MFM), works in
a similar way, but uses a magnetic tip to map the strength of magnetic domains on a sur-
face rather than the surface height. Both the AFM and MFM have slightly less resolution
than the STM (that is, they cannot usually detect single atoms); but because they (unlike
the STM) can be employed on insulators as well as conductors, and in air and fluids as
well as vacuum, they have become much more popular.
2. Some studies in this vein include Robert Kohler, Lords of the Fly (Chicago, 1994);
Boelie Elzen, “Two Ultracentrifuges: A Comparative Study of the Social Construction of
Artefacts,” Social Studies of Science 16 (1986): 621–62; and Thomas P. Hughes, “Model
Builders and Instrument Makers,” Science in Context 2 (1988): 59–75.
3. See Joan Lisa Bromberg, The Laser in America, 1950–1970 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1991), and Michael A. Grayson, ed., Measuring Mass: From Positive Rays to Proteins (Phil-
adelphia, 2002). Indeed, since there are now more than forty named types of probe 
tron microscopy or Timothy Lenoir and Christophe Lécuyer’s study of Var-
ian’s popularization of nuclear magnetic resonance, have examined the
“post-Cancun” phase of dispersion and commercialization.4 Even here
though, the emphasis has been on singular institutions, whether corporate
(e.g., RCA or Varian) or nonprofit (e.g., Stanford University or the Rocke-
feller Foundation), rather than on the shaping of instruments by actors dis-
tributed across multiple corporate, academic, and national organizations
and arrayed in shifting relationships of patron– client, consumer–producer,
inventor–replicator, and builder–user.
This is unfortunate. The relationships between corporations and uni-
versities that are built around such research technologies form an impor-
tant focus in public debates about academic capitalism and the future of
higher education.5 This old and wide-ranging debate gained momentum
during the 1970s as changes in law, academic culture, corporate research,
and national science funding have pushed universities to patent professors’
research, incubate start-up companies, and form substantial (and some-
times controversial) corporate partnerships. Proponents of change desire
that universities integrate fully with the market; naysayers decry the acad-
emy’s loss of independence and critical voice.
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microscopes, one could easily present the history of the field as an unending series of
invented variations. My focus here is less on these variants, most of which have few users,
and more on the mainly standardized, usually commercially available instruments. For
an analysis of the dichotomies between builders and buyers in probe microscopy, see
Cyrus C. M. Mody, “How Probe Microscopists Became Nanotechnologists,” in Discover-
ing the Nanoscale, ed. Davis Baird, Alfred Nordmann, and Joachim Schummer (Amster-
dam, 2004), 119–33.
4. Nicolas Rasmussen, Picture Control: The Electron Microscope and the Transfor-
mation of Biology in America, 1940–1960 (Stanford, Calif., 1997); Timothy Lenoir and
Christophe Lécuyer, “Instrument Makers and Discipline Builders: The Case of Nuclear
Magnetic Resonance,” Perspectives on Science 3 (1995): 276–345. An excellent study of the
transition from pre- to post-Cancun in several instrumental communities is Stuart
Blume, Insight and Industry: On the Dynamics of Technological Change in Medicine
(Cambridge, Mass., 1992). For analyses of the dispersion/dissemination of experimental
tools, see Kathleen Jordan and Michael Lynch, “The Dissemination, Standardization, and
Routinization of a Molecular Biological Technique,” Social Studies of Science 28 (1998):
773–800. For a similar study of theoretical tools, see David Kaiser, Drawing Things Apart:
The Dispersion of Feynman Diagrams in Postwar Physics (Chicago, 2005).
5. I adopt the phrase “research technologies” from Terry Shinn, “Crossing Boundar-
ies: The Emergence of Research-Technology Communities,” in Universities and the
Global Knowledge Economy: A Triple Helix of University–Industry–Government Relations,
ed. Henry Etkowitz and Loet Leydesdorff (London, 1997), 85–96. For a sampling of the
academic capitalism debate, see Norman E. Bowie, ed., University–Business Partnerships:
An Assessment (Lanham, Md., 1994); Derek Bok, Universities in the Marketplace: The
Commercialization of Higher Education (Princeton, N.J., 2003); Roger L. Geiger, Knowl-
edge and Money: Research Universities and the Paradox of the Marketplace (Stanford,
Calif., 2004); and the essays in Donald G. Stein, ed., Buying In or Selling Out: The Com-
mercialization of the American Research University (New Brunswick, N.J., 2004).
As Steven Shapin notes, both sides argue the issue abstractly, leading to
ludicrous over-praising of new patent laws on the one hand, and overly dire
warnings about corporate influence on the other.6 What empirical work
there is focuses exclusively on particularly entrepreneurial disciplines/
industries (biotechnology, microelectronics), universities (Stanford, MIT),
or regions (Silicon Valley, Route 128 near Boston).7 Yet many commercial-
ized research tools emerged from work done across disciplines, at multiple
universities and corporations around the globe. To understand how tech-
nologies move among universities and corporations and become commer-
cial products, we need a multi-institutional, multiregional, multidiscipli-
nary unit of analysis—what I will call an “instrumental community.”
By instrumental community I mean the porous group of people com-
monly oriented to building, developing, using, selling, and popularizing a
particular technology of measurement. Such communities are “instrumen-
tal” primarily in focusing on new research tools, namely, scientific instru-
ments. Because they include academic and commercial participants, such
communities will seek ways to morph these tools into industrially relevant
devices. Thus, such communities are also “instrumental” in focusing on new
ways of doing or making things. Instrumental communities are ubiquitous:
many tools’ development has had moments like that in Cancun in 1984,
when a community suddenly coalesces around a technology. Instrumental
communities have been an enduring presence in scientific and technological
development; indeed, the best recent work on the history of instrumentation
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6. Steven Shapin, “Ivory Trade,” London Review of Books 25 (2003): 15–19.
7. For disciplines/industries, see Christophe Lécuyer, Making Silicon Valley: Inno-
vation and the Growth of High-Tech, 1930–1970 (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), and Martin
Kenney, Biotechnology: The University-Industrial Complex (New Haven, Conn., 1986).
For studies of MIT and Stanford University, see Bernard Carlson, “Academic Entrepre-
neurship and Engineering Education: Dugald C. Jackson and the Cooperative Engi-
neering Course, 1907–1932,” Technology and Culture 29 (1988): 536–69; David Noble,
America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (Oxford,
1977); Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-
Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993); John Servos, “The Industrial
Relations of Science: Chemical Engineering at MIT, 1900–1939,” Isis 81 (1980): 531–49;
R. S. Lowen, “Transforming the University—Administrators, Physicists, and Industrial
and Federal Patronage at Stanford, 1935–49,” History of Education Quarterly 31, no. 3
(1991): 365–88; C. Lécuyer, “Academic Science and Technology in the Service of Indus-
try: MIT Creates a ‘Permeable’ Engineering School,” American Economic Review 88
(1998): 28–33; and Henry Etkowitz, MIT and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Science (Lon-
don, 2002). For Silicon Valley, Route 128, and emulations thereof, see Anna-Lee Saxen-
ian, Regional Networks: Industrial Adaptation in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1993); Peter Hall and Ann Markusen, eds., Silicon Landscapes (Boston, 1985);
Manuel Castells and Peter Hall, Technopoles of the World: The Making of Twenty-First-
Century Industrial Complexes (London, 1994); Stuart W. Leslie, “Regional Disadvan-
tage—Replicating Silicon Valley in New York’s Capital Region,” Technology and Culture
42 (2001): 236–64; and Martin Kenney, ed., Understanding Silicon Valley: The Anatomy of
an Entrepreneurial Region (Stanford, Calif., 2000).
examines pre-twentieth–century artisanal instrument makers and their cul-
tivation of communities of patrons and customers.8 During the past century
(and increasingly since the 1970s), examining the formation and organiza-
tion of instrumental communities means better understanding the interplay
of corporate and academic organizations—spanning multiple disciplines—
that shapes the development and proliferation of high technologies.
Probe Microscopy
The cultivation of an instrumental community begins with the inven-
tion of the instrument itself; indeed, such promotional activities are integral
to invention.9 Community-building meets organizational or disciplinary
goals and provides a safety net for inventors whose links to institutions are
precarious.10
The STM, for example, originated in 1979 at IBM Zurich as a character-
ization tool in making thin films for a commercially important supercom-
puter.11 When the supercomputer project died, Binnig and Rohrer lost the
organizational justification for their work. They prolonged its life, however,
first by hiding it within IBM’s bureaucratic folds, and later by forming
alliances with academic researchers. They assiduously cultivated academic
STM replicators in Spain, Germany, Switzerland, California, and elsewhere,
while also using the instrument to address basic research questions (partic-
ularly in the subfield of surface science) to attract the attention of both cor-
porate and academic scientists. When these efforts succeeded, IBM pro-
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8. Klaus Hentschel, Mapping the Spectrum: Techniques of Visual Representation in
Research and Teaching (Oxford, 2002); Myles W. Jackson, “Buying the Dark Lines of the
Spectrum: Joseph von Fraunhofer’s Standard for the Manufacture of Optical Glass,” in
Scientific Credibility and Technical Standards in 19th and Early 20th Century Germany
and Britain, ed. Jed Z. Buchwald (Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 1996), 1–22; and David
Pantalony, “Seeing a Voice: Rudolph Koenig’s Instruments for Studying Vowel Sounds,”
American Journal of Psychology 117 (2004): 425–42.
9. The STM, for instance, was preceded by a very similar instrument called the
Topografiner, built by Russell Young at the U.S. Bureau of Standards in 1969–70. But
because Young never convinced any wider group of people to attach themselves to the
Topografiner, it is fair to state that probe microscopy was not “invented” until Binnig and
Rohrer came along. See John Villarrubia, “The Topografiner: An Instrument for Mea-
suring Surface Microtopography,” in A Century of Excellence in Measurements, Standards,
and Technology—Selected Publications of NBS/NIST, 1901–2000, ed. David R. Lide and
Dean R. Stahl (Boca Raton, Fla., 2001), 214–18.
10. Indeed, inventors of instruments (or those who take credit for having invented
them) often seem to have troublesome positions within the firms that employ them. See,
for instance, the description of Kary Mullis’s antagonistic relationship with Cetus in Paul
Rabinow, Making PCR: A Story of Biotechnology (Chicago, 1996).
11. G. Binnig and H. Rohrer, “The Scanning Tunneling Microscope,” Scientific Amer-
ican 253 (1985): 50–56, and G. Binnig and H. Rohrer, “Scanning Tunneling Micros-
copy—From Birth to Adolescence,” Reviews of Modern Physics 59 (1987): 615–25.
moted STM at its labs in Zurich, Yorktown Heights, New York, and Almaden,
California. IBM’s research rival, Bell Labs, recruited STM groups in response.
Binnig and Rohrer skillfully exploited the permeability of the corporate–aca-
demic boundary. By allying with academia, they created a corporate space for
STM despite having lost an immediate commercial objective.
This permeability existed because corporate laboratories have long
depended on academia to supply recent Ph.D.s for postdoctoral or junior
staff positions. In subdisciplines such as surface science where researchers
were needed, these labs fostered professional societies, journals, and other
extramural institutions to maintain academic connections and participa-
tion.12 Some researchers alternated between corporate and academic re-
search, hence establishing networks between institutions; veterans of cor-
porate labs became reliable feeders to, and consultants for, those same labs
once they established their own academic groups. Most of the first aca-
demics to replicate the STM had direct ties of collaboration or employ-
ment to IBM, the Zurich laboratory, or personally to Binnig and Rohrer.
A few schools (namely Cornell, Penn State, Caltech, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, and Stanford) supplied the postdoctoral associates and man-
agers who developed STM at Bell Labs and at IBM’s Yorktown Heights and
Almaden research centers.13
Within such a small instrumental community, big corporate labs pre-
dominated. Early work centered on developing microscopes to meet mini-
mal operational benchmarks, usually the atomic resolution of materials
that the Zurich team had imaged. These materials—particularly silicon—
were metals and semiconductors with long histories in research and manu-
facturing at IBM and Bell Labs. Corporate STMers could draw on in-house
expertise in quickly making and understanding samples. After the Cancun
meeting, these minimal benchmarks were turned into fields of active re-
search in the race to achieve the atomic resolution of more and more met-
als and semiconductors.14 Early academic STMers such as Paul Hansma at
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12. For descriptions of the big corporate laboratories and their relations with uni-
versities, see George Wise, Willis R. Whitney, General Electric, and the Origins of U.S.
Industrial Research (New York, 1985); Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson, Crystal
Fire: The Birth of the Information Age (New York, 1997); Lillian Hartmann Hoddeson,
“The Roots of Solid-State Research at Bell Labs,” Physics Today 30 (1977): 23–30; and
Leonard Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research: Science and Business at GE
and Bell, 1876–1926 (Cambridge, Mass., 1985).
13. Joe Demuth, interview with Cyrus Mody, Yorktown Heights, N.Y., 22 February
2001; Joe Stroscio, interview with Cyrus Mody, Gaithersburg, Md., 28 June 2000; John
Villarrubia, interview with Cyrus Mody, Gaithersburg, Md., 28 June 2000; Randy Feen-
stra, interview with Cyrus Mody, Pittsburgh, 2 May 2001; John Foster, interview with
Cyrus Mody, Santa Barbara, Calif., 19 October 2001; Jene Golovchenko, interview with
Cyrus Mody, Cambridge, Mass., 20 February 2001.
14. Such races appear to be a recurring feature of young instrumental communities.
They are especially visible in Bromberg (n. 3 above).
the University of California at Santa Barbara, Calvin Quate at Stanford, and
John Baldeschwieler at Caltech were players in these races, but soon realized
they possessed neither the requisite expertise nor the resources to keep up
with the corporate labs.
Thus Hansma, Quate, and Baldeschwieler began carving out niches in
which they were not in direct competition with their corporate colleagues,
but could still benefit from the corporate–academic interaction.15 Their
instrument designs followed corporate STM models, but were targeted for
applications other than metals and semiconductors. For instance, almost all
early corporate STMers built ultrahigh vacuum (UHV) microscopes, since
metals and semiconductors grow oxide films or collect impurities in air. In
response, Hansma, followed by most other academic STMers, shifted
toward air operation. Air and UHV STMs have similar electronics and
mechanics, but academics preferred air STM for its simplicity and price and
because it appealed to disciplinarily diverse academic users rather than dis-
ciplinarily restricted corporate surface scientists. Hence, because they feared
being left behind by their corporate colleagues, academic STMers sought
out new research milestones and developed flexible designs that could yield
new applications and attract new adherents. Clearly, here was commerce
“influencing” academic research, yet it contradicts the dire scenario pre-
sented by some analysts. Corporations shaped academic work without
“buying” professors or students, and their influence rendered the STM
community more diverse and created spaces for unexpected innovation.16
Many other academic–industry linkages were part of early STM. From
1981 to 1986, all STMs (and, after 1985, AFMs) were custom-built rather
than purchased off-the-shelf. Constructing an instrument encompasses a
spectrum of practices, ranging from “building from scratch” to buying and
assembling. The commercialization of research usually represents a gradual
movement along this spectrum, rather than the sudden transformation of
a home-built research tool into an off-the-shelf commercial product. STM
builders spent much of their time locating commercial sources for micro-
scope components and fixing faulty instruments by thumbing through
manufacturers’ catalogs for new op amps and probe materials.17 The com-
mercial availability of components shaped STM designs, but the builders
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15. Paul Hansma, interview with Cyrus Mody, Santa Barbara, Calif., 19 March 2001.
16. This is a more common phenomenon than has been recognized. For instance,
some of today’s academic nanotechnology centers can be traced back to efforts during
the 1970s and ’80s to build facilities in which electrical engineering and applied physics
faculty could train students in the materials and methods used in the semiconductor
industry. Since such facilities were never as well endowed as those in companies such as
Intel and AMD, these faculty shifted focus by broadening their research for a multidisci-
plinary audience, hence giving current nanotechnology its interdisciplinary character.
From Harold Craighead, interview with Cyrus Mody, Ithaca, N.Y., 26 May 2005.
17. Golovchenko interview; Clayton Teague, interview with Cyrus Mody, Gaithers-
burg, Md., 6 June 2002.
were also active consumers: on the one hand, they took commercial prod-
ucts and adapted them for unforeseen uses; on the other, they negotiated
with suppliers for equipment (vacuum chambers, piezoelectric crystals,
video output devices, and so on) geared to their specific applications.18
Some suppliers such as Burleigh (a piezoceramic maker in upstate New
York) modified components and forged ongoing connections with STM
builders to design products specifically for the STM market.19 Creating the
tools of university research, from buildings to microscopes to reagents,
encompasses a wide variety of such corporate–academic linkages. Some
activities (e.g., ordering materials from a catalog; contracting with a builder
to remodel a laboratory) are relatively mundane; others (e.g., professors
consulting with manufacturers; academic designs being transferred to cor-
porate interests) attract both praise and protest.20
Once annual STM conferences commenced after Cancun, the labor
intensiveness of microscope-building decreased as knowledge and experi-
ence were disseminated. In this way, STM-building became standardized
through STMers’ nearly ritualistic allegiance to certain manufacturers.21
Experienced researchers recommended some brands over others because of
their proven operation; consequently, newcomers, eager to gain time, rarely
questioned such recommendations. For instance, IBM researchers used a
trademarked rubber called Viton (from DuPont) to dampen vibration be-
cause it could survive ultrahigh vacuum.22 Subsequently, academics adapted
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18. Much recent history of technology has focused on the active role of users. For
consumers’ adaptations of artifacts for uses that manufacturers were ignorant of, or even
opposed outright, see Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch, “Users as Agents of Technological
Change: The Social Construction of the Automobile in the Rural United States,” Tech-
nology and Culture 37 (1996): 763–95. For users’ pressure on companies (often—as in
instrumental communities—through threats to form their own cooperatives or compa-
nies), see Claude S. Fischer, America Calling: A Social History of the Telephone to 1940
(Berkeley, Calif., 1992). For an overview of different kinds of user activity, see the essays
in Nelly Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch, eds., How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of
Users and Technologies (Cambridge, Mass., 2003).
19. Dave Farrell, interview with Cyrus Mody, Rochester, N.Y., 29 May 2001; Golov-
chenko interview (n. 13 above). For an analysis of a similar phenomenon in particle
physics during the 1930s, see Peter Galison, Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Micro-
physics (Chicago, 1997), ch. 3.
20. For similar instances of negotiations between academic users of laboratory
products and the products’ manufacturers, see Michael Lynch, “Protocols, Practices, and
the Reproduction of Technique in Molecular Biology,” British Journal of Sociology 53
(2002): 203–20.
21. For treatments of the concept of tacit knowledge, especially as applied to instru-
ment-building, see H. M. Collins, “The Seven Sexes: A Study in the Sociology of a
Phenomenon, or the Replication of Experiments in Physics,” Sociology 9 (1975): 205–24;
Harry Collins, “Tacit Knowledge, Trust, and the Q of Sapphire,” Social Studies of Science
31 (2001): 71–86; and Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Phi-
losophy (New York, 1962).
22. Christoph Gerber, interview with Cyrus Mody, Zurich, Switzerland, 12 Novem-
the IBM design and Viton became a hallmark of tunneling microscopy, even
for those academic STMs that operated in air or fluid, not vacuum.23
Corporate and academic linkages also dictated what materials campus
laboratory groups examined with their microscopes and, indeed, how
microscope designs were geared to those materials. Sometimes this was the
result of direct influence, although it is unclear just who influenced whom.
Calvin Quate, for instance, framed his STM work within Stanford’s long
tradition of industrial connections and his own involvement during the
1970s in developing acoustic microscopy as a nondestructive characteriza-
tion tool for manufacturing.24 Nondestructive testing held tremendous
promise for microelectronics, in which chips are inspected throughout
manufacturing, but traditional tools (especially electron microscopy)
require breaking and discarding expensive silicon wafers. Quate embraced
STM, believing that it represented the next-generation nondestructive eval-
uation tool. He was quickly followed by his former students and postdoc-
toral associates at IBM.25
STM requires a conducting (metal or semiconductor) sample, however,
whereas most microelectronic materials have an insulating oxide layer;
indeed, the controlled growth of oxides is crucial to turning silicon wafers
into integrated circuits. This requirement was not problematic for corpo-
rate surface scientists tasked with generating basic knowledge about mate-
rials like silicon and gallium arsenide. Yet STM’s restriction to conducting
materials prohibited its use in nondestructive testing and hindered its
spreading into fields other than surface science. Those who wanted to carve
out interdisciplinary niches for STM considered this restriction repressing;
chief among these were Gerd Binnig (an IBM employee but not a surface
scientist) and Quate (and his former students and postdoctoral associates
at IBM). So when IBM allowed Binnig to take a sabbatical leave at Stanford
University during 1985–86, he and Quate advanced beyond STM to invent
AFM, which, because it uses interatomic forces rather than tunneling to
sense height, can map insulating materials. Thus Quate positioned his re-
search further in advance of IBM’s manufacturing cycle than did most of
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ber 2001; Rudd Tromp, interview with Cyrus Mody, Yorktown Heights, N.Y., 23 February
2001; Virgil Elings, interview with Cyrus Mody, Santa Barbara, Calif., 20 March 2001.
23. For similar instances of practices spreading throughout an experimental com-
munity by transmission of knowledge about particular brands, see Jordan and Lynch,
“The Dissemination, Standardization, and Routinization of a Molecular Biological Tech-
nique” (n. 4 above).
24. Mike Kirk, interview with Cyrus Mody, Sunnyvale, Calif., 12 October 2001; Dan
Rugar, interview with Cyrus Mody, Almaden, Calif., 14 March 2001; Foster interview (n.
13 above). See C. F. Quate, “Acoustic Microscopy—Recollections,” IEEE Transactions on
Sonics and Ultrasonics 32 (1985): 132–35, for a brief description of scanning acoustic
microscopy at Stanford.
25. Quate’s optimism for STM derived from its ultrahigh resolution and the fact that
(ideally) the STM tip does not touch (and thereby mar) the sample surface.
the company’s own STM researchers. Together, IBM and Stanford dramat-
ically altered the world of academic and corporate probe microscopy.
As Daniel Lee Kleinman has shown, however, corporate influence over
academic research usually flows through the indirect control over experi-
mental materials rather than the overt guiding of objectives.26 For instance,
when academic STM researchers designed microscopes for use in water or
air they needed new yardstick materials (given the unsuitability of metals
and semiconductors). Gold, paraffin, and graphite vied for the job, but the
latter won out partly because ultrapure samples could be obtained cheaply.27
Union Carbide used graphite to make monochromators for neutrons, an
application requiring extraordinarily pure samples. It rejected large
amounts of slightly imperfect graphite that was still pure enough for STM
use. Quate and colleagues heard about this and alerted other academic
groups who then contacted Union Carbide’s graphite man, Arthur Moore,
to obtain cheap, standardized samples. Thus, these dispersed academic re-
searchers built networks within their instrumental community by relying on
corporate largesse. As dependence on this largesse spread, it formed the basis
for a standardized research infrastructure.
The Road to Commercialization
Crucial to commercialization of academic work on STM and AFM was
the early division of the community into two distinct, dynamically linked
styles: surface-science STM researchers located predominantly in corporate
laboratories; and early academics (Quate, Hansma, Baldeschwieler, and
others), along with their collaborators and Quate’s former students at
IBM.28 Corporate surface-science STMers, particularly at Bell Labs and
IBM, worked in large, resource-rich institutions alongside many people
who were qualified to judge their work, whether they were competitors
assigned to similar projects or managers empowered to review and advance
or hinder careers.29 Postdoctoral associates and junior staff scientists build-
ing STMs were under tremendous schedule pressures and so stuck to insti-
tutionally approved projects. STM-building in corporate labs required a
delicate balance: researchers not only had to design and use their micro-
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2001.
28. The pedagogical roots of this split are analyzed in Cyrus C. M. Mody, “Instru-
ments in Training: The Growth of American Probe Microscopy in the 1980s,” in Peda-
gogy and the Practice of Science: Producing Physical Scientists, 1800–2000, ed. David Kaiser
(Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 185–216.
29. Jane Frommer, interview with Cyrus Mody, Almaden, Calif., 14 March 2001;
Dawn Bonnell, interview with Cyrus Mody, Philadelphia, 26 February 2001.
scopes to demonstrate individual initiative, but also to integrate well with a
disciplined and insular corporate style.
Academic STM researchers were more dispersed and looked to a more
diffuse audience. Where the corporate labs built what Terry Shinn calls
“narrow niche” instruments geared to limited applications, academic
groups moved toward a “research technology” paradigm of generic tools
relevant to a variety of disciplines.30 Because they had yet to find suitable
applications for these tools, Quate, Hansma, and other early academic
STMers trained students primarily to build highly flexible microscopes, and
only secondarily to use them. This led to a proliferation of microscope de-
signs such as STM in water, air, oil, and gas, and the critical shift to AFM. It
also led students to test microscopes on readily available materials rather
than on scientifically disciplined specimens: leaves of houseplants, pola-
roids, bone from rib-eye steaks, ice, and the electrochemistry of Coke ver-
sus Pepsi, to name a few.31 This whimsicality was accompanied by bricolage
in instrument-building. The Baldeschwieler group made STM probes from
pencil leads, for instance, while the Hansma group made AFM tips from
hand-crushed, pawn-shop diamonds glued to tinfoil cantilevers with
brushes made from their own eyebrow hairs.
It was difficult to make such images interesting or credible. Even where
some disciplinary community had expertise about these materials—bio-
chemists, for instance, know about bone and leaves—the specimens were
prepared so haphazardly that images of them were unintelligible. These
academic STM and AFM groups had little in-house expertise about what
questions to ask concerning samples or how to interpret images of them.
Therefore group leaders imported collaborators (postdoctoral associates or
junior professors) for a few weeks or months to learn about probe micro-
scopy and then leave to establish new STM and AFM groups and report on
the microscopes to their specific disciplines.32 These visitors fit into an on-
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19 (1989): 387–420.
going tradition of teamwork at the California schools. Where corporate
surface-science STMers worked in insulated, highly competitive, hierarchi-
cal groups (a manager overseeing postdoctoral associates and technicians),
their academic counterparts thrived in a permissive atmosphere wherein
students and their postdoctoral colleagues simultaneously worked on their
“own” as well other microscopes, and personnel and materials moved from
project to project as needed. When they left, some of these temporary col-
laborators founded similar microscope-building programs; others simply
took a second-hand instrument with them to aid in their desire to carve out
a distinctive place within their home disciplines and secure tenure.33
Eventually, this dynamic fostered commercial production of STMs and
AFMs. Outright commercialization, however, was preceded by a gray mar-
ket in which researchers produced surplus microscope parts that they
traded with acquaintances in the expanding network of STMers and
AFMers—sometimes for money, more often for other tokens such as pres-
tige or experimental materials.34 Once IBM research management dis-
cerned STM’s discovery-making potential, for instance, it pushed for
expansion of STM work at its facilities. New STM researchers were hired to
build microscopes—a laborious task with few guarantees of success. In-
deed, the first replication at the Yorktown Heights laboratory failed, and the
next one took almost two years to catch up with Zurich.35 Expansion pro-
ceeded more swiftly in Switzerland, where newcomers could interact per-
sonally with the inventors. Still, the labor investment was daunting, espe-
cially for those whose postdoctoral appointments meant operating on
limited time horizons.
Consequently, IBM began making semi-standardized, batch-produced
STM packages available to its researchers.36 The first was the “Blue Box”
designed by Othmar Marti, a Swiss graduate student undertaking doctoral
work at IBM Zurich.37 The Blue Box was primarily an electronics package.
Researchers constructed the hardware themselves, often using the Zurich
team’s designs. STM electronics presented a significant challenge because
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complicated feedback circuitry brings the probe to the surface, reads out
and controls the tunnel current, and rasters the tip without crashing. The
success of the Blue Box in allowing newcomers to work around these diffi-
culties inspired a more ambitious effort at IBM Yorktown Heights. There,
Joe Demuth, manager of an STM group, assigned his postdoctoral associ-
ates to work with the lab’s Central Scientific Services (CSS) shop to develop
and batch-produce complete STMs to “sell” to other researchers within the
organization.38
By 1990, ten to twenty of these CSS STMs were in use at Yorktown
Heights and the nearby Hawthorne facility. Some also traveled to academic
groups when postdoctoral associates departed to assume professorships.39
Yorktown Heights management encouraged the use of the CSS STM by
making its purchase a zero-cost budget item. Still, groups had to invest
labor—usually by a postdoctoral associate—to make the microscope pro-
ductive. This created a dilemma for its postdoctoral users: on the one hand,
they needed to creatively solve technical problems and display initiative to
managers in order to advance to staff positions; but on the other, advance-
ment also required navigating competitive institutional politics whereby
groups worked in parallel on similar projects and were rewarded relative to
one another. Postdoctoral associates using the CSS STM found that they
were viewed as partisans of Demuth’s style of microscopy. So as to avoid
alienating other factions at the laboratory and also display their own prowess
in experimentation, they redesigned and rebuilt large sections of the CSS
instrument. The research organization at Yorktown Heights constrained the
CSS microscope from becoming a widely commercialized black box.40
The CSS STM was a kind of commercialization of tunneling micro-
scopy for the internal IBM market. Had the culture at Yorktown Heights
promoted formation of start-ups or collaborations with instrument man-
ufacturers, the CSS microscope could have become the first mass-marketed
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STM.41 After the early 1990s’ recession made IBM leaner and more out-
ward-looking, it did market an AFM—Yorktown Heights’ SXM—to the
semiconductor industry. However, this exception proves the rule. The SXM
was invented by a former postdoctoral employee of Quate’s and owed
much to his style of work, rather than to the surface-science tradition that
produced the CSS STM. But its commercialization was hindered by its IBM
origins: although capable of astonishing resolution of the sidewalls of inte-
grated circuit features, it was too punctilious and unreliable (it needed a
Ph.D. operator) to attract an industry devoted to tools that could be con-
tinuously operated by relatively unskilled workers.42
Researchers at Yorktown Heights clearly were not acquiring an unprob-
lematic black box that commodified microscope-building knowledge.
Groups that regarded it in this vein often couldn’t get it to work.43 Most
researchers at the lab felt an institutionally driven need to prove they could
obtain this knowledge on their own; therefore most users of the CSS STM
were purchasing time, a chance to enter a dynamic instrumental commu-
nity and quickly establish for themselves the instrument-building creden-
tials of veterans. In return, its designers received prestige and influence
rather than money. Similar motivations governed the first academic STM
start-ups. Established STM and AFM groups—especially the ones of Quate,
Hansma, and Baldeschwieler—had long given advice and blueprints to new
builders. This often consisted of guidance in buying reliable components
for a homemade instrument and assembling purchased components in
accordance with available blueprints. Whatever could not be bought was
made by hand or batch-produced. These custom components circulated
widely as gifts.44 Software in particular passed from group to group, and
from student cohort to cohort within research groups. Both academic and
corporate groups created software code that they proffered to collaborators,
thereby strengthening the group’s position within the instrumental com-
munity and ensuring access to collaborators’ modifications to the code.45
MODYK|KCommercializing Probe Microscopy
69
41. For a similar analysis of how corporate culture at IBM sometimes kept innova-
tions from percolating, see Ross Knox Bassett, To the Digital Age: Research Labs, Start-Up
Companies, and the Rise of MOS Technology (Baltimore, 2002).
42. Likewise, attempts at spinning off small companies from Bell Labs’ probe micro-
scope research during the 1990s fell apart partly because of managers’ inexperience in
dealing with commercialization efforts by their subordinates. Moreover, the size and
inward focus of both IBM and Bell Labs hindered these companies from cleanly patent-
ing (and hence reaping profits from) their STM and AFM work. See Griffith interview
(n. 35 above).
43. Bonnell interview.
44. Davis Baird, “Scientific Instrument Making, Epistemology, and the Conflict be-
tween Gift and Commodity Economies,” Ludus Vitalis Supplement 2 (1997): 1–16. The
“moral economy” of making gifts and exchanges in an instrumental community is
described in Kohler (n. 2 above).
45. Miguel Salmeron, interview with Cyrus Mody, Berkeley, Calif., 9 March 2001;
Lindsay interview (n. 33 above).
Code was sometimes presented free of charge, other times at nominal cost;
profit was not the motive for dissemination.
The most popular hardware innovation was the microfabricated AFM
cantilever. One perceived defect of early AFMs was that probes were labo-
riously handmade from small strips of aluminum foil with a tiny sliver of
diamond glued on one side and a tiny shard of glass on the other.46 Al-
though these cantilevers could yield exquisite AFM images, each required
considerable time and training, and results were so particular to one can-
tilever and its maker that images taken with different cantilevers were diffi-
cult to compare. Handmade cantilevers sufficed early on, when every image
was new and spectacular; but as the technique evolved, AFMers sought
standardization. Quate’s group delivered this by integrating itself with
microlithography expertise at Stanford University and around Silicon
Valley. Over several years, Quate shared his students with other electrical
engineering professors at Stanford, thereby allowing them to understand
AFM before going on to learn how to pattern and etch silicon into small,
standardized batches of cantilevers. By 1990, Quate began sending surplus
probes to friends and collaborators, occasionally so that he and his students
could share authorship of collaborators’ papers. Quate-type probes rapidly
became essential to the AFM infrastructure.47
Generally, only parts of microscopes circulated in this way. Quate,
Hansma, and Baldeschwieler occasionally gave complete microscopes to
long-term collaborators, but not to casual acquaintances. Most newcomers
desired the credentials and experimental control that came with building
their own microscopes, but few wanted to take the time to build an STM
from scratch. Thus, by 1986, demand grew for a commercial microscope to
assist these researchers in their work. In this environment, Doug Smith,
who was a student of Quate’s, founded the Tunneling Microscope Com-
pany. Smith’s company was an extension of, rather than a break from, the
earlier probe-microscope gray market. Like the Blue Box and the CSS STM,
Smith’s instruments were more starter kits than black-boxed devices and
sold to people with the skill, but not the time to build one themselves. In
order to attain a completed instrument, customers needed to assemble
much of it on their own.48 All Smith’s company sold was the microscope
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“head”: the piezoelectric scanner, tip, base, and vibration-isolating stacks of
Viton. Customers built the electronics themselves, customizing the micro-
scope for their own applications.
Smith had only one employee, a fellow student who helped put together
scanners, and he solicited customers by word of mouth. He viewed the
company less as an ongoing enterprise than as a way to sweeten the hard-
ships of graduate school. An oft-told story is that he sold just enough
microscopes to buy a BMW automobile before taking a postdoctoral posi-
tion. Quate himself was ambivalent about commercialism creeping into his
lab. He demanded that Smith separate scholarship and business more
cleanly: “Dr. Quate said ‘graduate students work, eat, and sleep, and most of
the time they go hungry.’ You can’t have a company and be a graduate stu-
dent at the same time, so Doug had to finish up and move out.”49
Meanwhile, Virgil Elings, Hansma’s colleague in the University of Cali-
fornia, Santa Barbara physics department, heard about STM from Niko
Garcia, a visiting Spanish academic with close ties to IBM Zurich. After
talking with Garcia and Hansma and attending the 1986 STM conference
in Spain, Elings discerned a market for off-the-shelf STMs and proposed
co-founding a company with Hansma to manufacture them. Hansma was
even more wary than Quate of letting commerce encroach upon his lab’s
activities, so he declined, but he did give Elings the same advice and sche-
matics he made available to other STMers.50 With these, Elings and his son
built a prototype STM in their garage and entered it in the latter’s junior
high school science fair (where it took last place, since, as the judges
pointed out, “everybody knows you can’t see atoms”).51
For Elings, building the prototype not only served the purpose of en-
suring that the Hansma design was marketable, but also as a means of test-
ing—and discarding—many axioms of STM-building that had accrued
since 1981. Elings regarded STM builders’ trade secrets as fostering instru-
ments that were erratic and difficult to operate. He viewed the possession
of these trade secrets as a limiting factor in the makeup of the STM com-
munity, because only those deemed “serious” enough to build their own
microscopes could belong. Elings wanted to make STMs specifically for
nonbuilders who demanded a simple-to-operate black box. Hence he de-
lighted in debunking the STM-builders’ secrets by creating a more stream-
lined, durable, and easy-to-use tool.
Elings co-founded Digital Instruments (DI), hoping to be the first to
market a commercial STM microscope by the time of the annual STM con-
ference in 1987. Although his plan was always to sell a computer-controlled
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microscope (hence Digital Instruments), his former student (and DI co-
founder) Gus Gurley was brought in too late to complete all the coding in
time. Instead, Elings marketed the analog Nanoscope I as DI’s first product.
Probe microscopists from this era—both builders and buyers—recall their
first acquaintance with the Nanoscope as being a turning point in the field.
Now, for the first time, researchers could join the STM community without
having had to build any part of their own microscopes. Moreover, unlike
the Tunneling Microscope Company’s clients, DI’s didn’t need to have per-
sonal ties to the community. Researchers could (and did) simply contact
Digital Instruments and order the instrument.
Still, although it marked an important shift, the Nanoscope I illustrated
the gradual, emergent character of commercialization in the field. Digital
Instruments retained much of the flavor of a laboratory like Quate’s or Hans-
ma’s, for Elings only gradually came to sell a more finished, integrated prod-
uct. Like the CSS STM and Smith’s instrument, the Nanoscope I was more a
kit than a full-fledged, black-boxed research tool. Indeed, both for the Nano-
scope I’s early imperfect design and its lack of “serious” applications, Elings
now calls this era at DI the “toy business.”52 In following Hansma’s lead,
Elings designed an air STM rather than the expensive, narrow-niche, ultra-
high vacuum instruments used at IBM and Bell Labs. This made sense in
establishing a broader market, since few disciplines were willing to work with
or pay for ultrahigh vacuum (which, in any case, ruined samples relevant to
everyone except surface scientists). But it was unclear during the 1980s just
what air STM could be used for or what the images it produced meant. Only
in 1991–92 did a consensus develop that air STM was, in fact, not relying on
tunneling for its contrast mechanism, and that many well-publicized air
STM images (particularly of DNA) were erroneous. As a result, most STM
researchers using air abandoned the technique and followed Quate and
Hansma to AFM, usually by acquiring one of DI’s newly available “Multi-
modes” (which were capable of running both STM and AFM).
Therefore the Nanoscope I and other air STMs had little rigorous appli-
cation, although until 1991–92 it seemed possible that such applications
would materialize if researchers could acquire inexpensive commercial
STMs and adapt them for unforeseen purposes. The Nanoscope I was a
“toy” because it was meant to be superseded, and because its buyers were
envisioned as instrument-savvy and willing to experiment playfully with
their new device until promising applications were found (not unlike DI’s
engineers themselves).53 This assumption of similarity between designers
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and users allowed new designs and applications to flow in from the market
and inform production of the more black-boxed, all-digital Nanoscope II.
Hence innovation came rapidly because participants in the probe-micro-
scopy field comprised an experienced and critical body. In fact, researchers
who had previously built their own STMs formed a small but elite group of
DI’s early customers. This demonstrates why analyses of academic com-
mercialization (both pro and con) should focus less exclusively on produc-
tion, and more on professors’ strategic combination of consumption and
production. Academic researchers are well positioned to be active con-
sumers whose reinterpretations of products flow back to the manufactur-
ers and reshape design and marketing. As recent work in the history and
sociology of technology has shown, users of many technologies actively
shape the design and use of artifacts. This phenomenon is especially pro-
nounced in instrumental communities, where the boundary between pro-
ducers and consumers is especially tenuous.54
The assumed similarities of DI’s engineers and early customers also
reinforced its self-image as a freewheeling start-up that could rely on its
users to make up for its lack of marketing and customer service. Elings had
no sales force—he simply advertised in Physics Today (“$25,000 for atomic
resolution”), and orders subsequently arrived. Instruments were sent to
purchasers who assembled them and got them up and running on their
own. Despite this minimal marketing and customer service (and limited
product utility), Elings’s fledgling business succeeded. An advertisement
from 1990 estimates that during its first three years, DI sold more than 300
Nanoscopes at $25,000 to $35,000 apiece.55 The probe-microscopy com-
munity expanded quickly, and its center of gravity shifted as well. As more
researchers purchased instruments, AFM and air STM started superseding
ultrahigh vacuum STM, and consequently, the corporate laboratories be-
came less dominant. High demand created a waiting list, which instigated
the policy that researchers who wanted a microscope quickly could expe-
dite matters by naming DI’s founders or employees as co-authors of papers
reporting on research generated with the company’s products.
DI recognized that to create a market among scientists and engineers, it
had to demonstrate its trustworthiness as a producer both of microscopes
and expertise.56 Through its existing customers, the company associated
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credible facts with its product and its employees, hoping thereby to entice
potential consumers to join the probe-microscopy community.57 Notably,
because the community still operated largely in a gray market, DI had to rely
heavily on tactics such as bartering waiting-list position for shared author-
ship. Such tactics gradually diminished as the community became more
commercial. Indeed, in this context, “commercialization” often signifies the
narrowing of the varieties of exchange as a technology stabilizes, rather than
the encroachment of a peculiarly corporate ethic into academia.58
The Roots of Digital Instruments’ Success
Because DI was the first serious STM manufacturer, its competitors and
successors played according to its terms. Some competed head-on for the
general, multidisciplinary market; in the end, these firms faltered. Others
who concentrated on smaller subcommunities have fared better, but still
have to cope with the prospect that someday DI might target their market
niche. Unlike the majority of academic start-ups, DI has been immensely
profitable and innovative, yet this unusual success highlights broader truths
about the commercialization of academic knowledge.59 In particular, the
contingent character of the instrumental community surrounding STM
and AFM—and DI’s role in it—elucidates debates about how universities
can promote entrepreneurial activities among their faculty and whether
academic entrepreneurialism can be a driver in regional economies.
From a regional perspective, DI clearly benefited from the geography of
probe-microscope research, but in unexpected ways. Hansma and Elings
both molded their free-form experimental styles to their group members’
notions of “California culture.”60 At the University of California, Santa Bar-
bara, for instance (in contrast to STM groups at IBM and Bell Labs), Hans-
ma’s group integrated self-cultivating hobbies (photography, woodwork-
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ing, meditation, travel) with gray-market activities in the laboratory: un-
disciplined exploration of the instrument’s capabilities, trolling for new ap-
plications, and collaborations between instrument-builders and represen-
tatives of various disciplines. Eventually, this mélange of exploratory
individualism and easy-going collaboration fed into DI and similarly off-
beat start-ups at universities on the West Coast. None of the successful STM
and AFM manufacturers were big, established companies like Hitachi,
Philips, or IBM (although big companies did make forays), and except for
small European firms, almost all manufacturers obtained their initial
designs through collaborations with academic (or quasi-academic national
laboratory) groups in the American West or Southwest.
Digital Instruments’s greatest regional stimulus, however, was largely
negative. DI emerged within, but was separate from, the enormous mili-
tary-industrial manufacturing complex of Santa Barbara and the Los
Angeles basin. Many early DI employees wanted to stay close to the area’s
picturesque and casual environment and viewed DI as the only alternative
to local defense firms.61 This offers a curious lesson for those hoping to
stimulate regional innovation. Universities do participate in local culture,
but they have little control over which aspects of local culture professors
adopt as emblematic of their experimental styles. Nor can universities con-
trol how those professors integrate local culture with the values and social
contours of widely distributed instrumental communities. When the STM
community’s division of labor encouraged academic groups to be more
exploratory than corporate ones, Hansma and Elings were able to guide lab
work via constructions of a “California” of casual lifestyle and self-actual-
ization; but they also relied heavily on the military-industrial “California”
of Lockheed Martin and Vandenberg Air Force Base in finding personnel
and acquiring resources.
Likewise, DI’s success had roots in institutional arrangements at the
University of California, Santa Barbara, though not in the patent and tech-
nology-transfer offices favored by proponents of academic entrepreneurial-
ism. Rather, DI and Elings thrived at the university’s disreputable margins.
When Elings arrived in the late 1960s as a brash, confrontational professor,
it was hoped he would build the university’s reputation in high-energy
physics. His swagger, however, led to conflict with his department, which
sidelined him into running its less prestigious Master’s of Scientific Instru-
mentation program, a lucrative but unloved backwater.62 Undaunted, Elings
transformed the program into his personal empire and a fountainhead for
patents and start-up companies.
Crucially, in Elings’s master’s program students from many educational
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61. The same can be said for employees at the smaller start-up manufacturers in Los
Angeles: Quanscan, Topometrix, Pacific Scanning, and Quesant.
62. Jerome Wiedmann, interview with Cyrus Mody, Santa Barbara, Calif., 18 Octo-
ber 2001.
backgrounds (biologists, engineers, even psychology majors) learned how
to build all kinds of measurement technologies, including not only research
instruments but also industrially relevant meters and tools. Initially, Elings
relied on orthodox classroom instruction; soon, however, he drifted toward
an alternative method that prized tacit over formal knowledge and partici-
pation over instruction. Instead of using textbooks and lectures, he con-
nected students with professors on campus who needed instruments built
and then let them learn by actually doing. Because student projects were
based on finding solutions to real problems faced by local researchers, they
often yielded technologies that Elings could market to those researchers’
subdisciplines. Students learned how to understand customers’ needs and
hence design technologies to address them. This approach made his former
students the most important source of initial employees for all Elings’s ven-
tures, especially Digital Instruments.
So, in a way, the University of California, Santa Barbara encouraged the
creation of DI, although no other school would replicate its method. By
sidelining a brilliant but difficult professor to a poorly regarded master’s
program, it encouraged him to reject campus culture, denigrate academi-
cally instilled formal knowledge, and be receptive to the commercial possi-
bilities of the knowledge his students accrued. Moreover, in warning that
Elings’s commercial ventures hindered his academic career, the university’s
physicists made it more likely that his next enterprise—Digital Instru-
ments—would result in his leaving academia. Paradoxically, this tension
between Elings and the university smoothed the technology transfer from
Hansma to DI, because Elings’s hostility toward academic researchers
meant he rejected Hansma’s designs until they had been engineered to look
more like commercial products than most home-built instruments.
Nonetheless, the similarity of work in Hansma’s group to the pedagogi-
cal style Elings derived for his master’s program is striking. Both Elings and
Hansma regarded tacit, rather than formal, knowledge as primary in instru-
ment-building. This meant that both men sought out people with diverse
and unusual educational backgrounds: junior high school students, river
guides, undergraduates, yoga instructors, retirees, psychology majors, and
historians.63 This diversity would have been unthinkable at other centers of
probe microscopy. The shared emphasis on tacit knowledge meant that both
DI and Hansma’s group thrived on self-cultivating activities that seemingly
were unrelated to technical matters. Digital Instruments, for instance, held a
weekly “inventing session” in which employees brainstormed for solutions
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63. James Massie, interview with Cyrus Mody, Santa Barbara, Calif., 18 October
2001; Helen Hansma, interview with Cyrus Mody, Santa Barbara, Calif., 19 March 2001;
Dan Bocek, interview with Cyrus Mody, Santa Barbara, Calif., 23 March 2001; Thomp-
son interview (n. 51 above); Drake interview (n. 33 above); Paul Hansma interview (n.
15 above).
to esoteric (i.e., non-AFM-relevant) technical questions (e.g., “How do you
make a self-balancing laundry machine?”) to become better inventors and
hone their skills at withstanding Elings’s intense skepticism.64
As members of DI and Hansma’s group recognized parallels between
their organizational styles, they appropriated these similarities to accelerate
the two-way flow of people, materials, designs, and knowledge. After the ini-
tial phase (when most DI employees were Elings’s former graduate stu-
dents), several of Hansma’s graduates, postdoctoral appointees, and collab-
orators worked at DI.65 Individuals in both organizations collaborated to
translate Hansma’s research into commercial products. For instance, the
Hansma AFM (on which DI’s fortunes eventually relied) was transformed
into a product through negotiations between Barney Drake (Hansma’s
technician) and James Massie (Elings’s former student) regarding which
elements of the Hansma design were indispensable and which were too
erratic for commercial use.66 As DI’s sales increased, Hansma’s group re-
mained in the vanguard of the AFM community through its steady supply
of DI instruments and the capability of Hansma’s students through prox-
imity to visit DI to scavenge parts and advice.67 Whatever his initial reser-
vations about commercialization, Hansma came to regard the partnership
with DI as a means to position himself—intellectually and socially—within
the instrumental community. This kind of strategic use of commercializa-
tion for academic purposes is rarely commented on by either defenders or
critics of academic capitalism.
Subsequently, once the “toy business” phase of DI ended in the early
1990s, Elings began to imitate Hansma’s tactic of bringing in postdoctoral
associates to guide his instrument-builders’ efforts. Digital Instruments
assembled its own group of researchers from biophysics, magnetics, and
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64. Pete Maivald, interview with Cyrus Mody, Santa Barbara, Calif., 18 October
2001; Bocek interview.
65. Jason Cleveland, interview with Cyrus Mody, Santa Barbara, Calif., 20 March
2001; Gould interview (n. 60 above); Prater interview (n. 31 above). Personnel ties
between the Hansma group(s) and DI were complex. Of Paul Hansma’s graduate stu-
dents, Scot Gould worked at DI for a summer, Craig Prater eventually became a senior
executive in the company, and Jason Cleveland was there for a few years before starting
another company, Asylum Research (double entendre intended), with other DI rebels;
another, Mario Viani, went straight to Asylum. One of Paul Hansma’s postdoctoral asso-
ciates, Roger Proksch, was at DI before going on to Asylum; one of Helen Hansma’s post-
doctoral associates, Irene Revenko, moved to and stayed at DI. Paul Hansma’s most
important technician, Barney Drake, started a company, Imaging Services, that was
housed within DI and acted as a clearinghouse for potential DI customers. Stuart Lind-
say, an early collaborator of Paul Hansma’s, started up a company, Molecular Imaging,
that, early on, primarily made complementary hardware for DI’s products (which DI
marketed). Many more Hansma group personnel also had less formal consultative rela-
tionships with DI.
66. Drake interview; Massie interview.
67. Hoh interview (n. 33 above).
polymer chemistry who (as did Hansma’s postdoctoral associates) worked
with instrument-builders, developed and published articles on new STM
and AFM applications, and traveled to lecture and attend conferences to
publicize the company’s efforts.68 Although DI was a profit-making ven-
ture, its success came partly from the nonprofit practices of the Hansma
group that it emulated: undertaking research, publishing articles, and train-
ing employees in the skills needed to “graduate” and found their own
probe-microscopy companies. These practices were then widely emulated
by other start-ups, such as Park Scientific Instruments (founded by Sung-Il
Park and Sang-Il Park, who were [unrelated] Stanford postdoctoral associ-
ates), Molecular Imaging (founded by Stuart Lindsay and Tianwei Jing, one
of Lindsay’s former postdoctoral associates), and Quanscan (later reorgan-
ized as Topometrix, founded with John Baldeschwieler’s help by Paul West,
one of his former postdoctoral associates). All of these companies brought
aspects of academic research to their operations.69
This movement of cultural values, experimental practices, and organi-
zational structure from university to start-up is well documented in other
fields of commercialization, especially biotechnology, where it was used to
entice professors out of the ivory tower. This led to trouble when profes-
sors-turned-entrepreneurs were reluctant to guide their companies from
research to profit-making. In contrast, with STM and AFM the corporate–
academic isomorphism was successful less as a deliberate strategy than as a
contingent and emergent harmonization of practices. It was largely an acci-
dental outcome of the organization of the instrumental community that
Quate, Hansma, and other academics promoted a gray market of circulat-
ing personnel, practices, and technologies that ultimately fostered success-
ful commercialization. The pedagogy associated with this gray market was
disinterested in commercialism, yet when players in these groups commer-
cialized their instruments, they used that very pedagogy as a paradigm for
companies and markets.
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68. Instrument manufacturers’ use of researchers to produce articles and application
notes is a prominent feature of both Rasmussen (n. 4 above) and Lenoir and Lécuyer (n.
4 above); Sergei Magonov, interview with Cyrus Mody, Santa Barbara, Calif., 21 March
2001; Mike Allen, interview with Cyrus Mody, Alameda, Calif., 12 October 2001.
69. The copying of experimental/organizational style first from university to start-up,
and then among a field of start-ups, is a classic example of “institutional isomorphism”—
the spread of innovations across organizations due to competition for personnel whose
professional affiliations demand particular organizational forms or practices. See Paul J.
DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism
and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review 48
(1983): 148–60, and Paul J. DiMaggio, “Constructing an Organizational Field as a Profes-
sional Project: U.S. Art Museums, 1920–1940,” in The New Institutionalism in Organiza-
tional Analysis, ed. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (Chicago, 1991), 267–92.
Conclusions
So what does probe microscopy tell us about the commercialization of
academic knowledge and the value of corporate–academic linkages? First,
the development of probe microscopy illustrates how completely—though
intricately and indirectly—the corporate and academic worlds are intercon-
nected. The locus of “academic research” is much wider than the university
campus, just as the locus of “commerce” is wider than the for-profit busi-
ness. Instrumental communities and other informal organizations are dis-
tributed across academic and corporate institutions. Commercialization—
the transformation of academic research into commerce—is not a simple
pipeline from university to firm. Commercialization can play many roles
within an instrumental community, and academic research can be traded
for many things other than money. Attempts, therefore, to directly stimulate
and accelerate the transformation of academic research into cash may well
backfire. As we have seen, it was the looser, indirect ties between corporate
and academic groups that fostered the growth of STM and AFM and en-
couraged start-ups to emerge from universities, rather than direct pressure
from corporations or overt incentives from governments and universities.
Proponents of academic entrepreneurialism should be wary of focusing
too narrowly on increased profits as the outcome of commercialized uni-
versities. As indicated above, exchange is continuous in instrumental com-
munities and usually is a mix of knowledge, prestige, personnel, time,
materials, money, and opportunity. The popularity of various forms of
barter changes as the community itself changes; for example, commercial-
ization can restrict some exchanges and promote others, such as money-
based trades. Few instrumental communities reach this point, however.
Even within the probe-microscopy community, only the atomic-force
microscope and magnetic-force microscope have been commercial suc-
cesses. The STM, which provided the first product for microscope manu-
facturers, was effective in training engineers to build microscopes, but it
never found an industrial application. The presence of gray markets in
instrumentation may enhance national economic growth over time, but
university administrators who hope that a particular gray market can be
converted into a profit-making start-up to enhance local, short-term eco-
nomic growth will almost always be disappointed.
Moreover, development of an entrepreneurial instrumental community
may require that its members be recruited from less-profitable fields in
which commercialization did not occur. The STM and AFM community,
for instance, initially drew on its members’ expertise in low-energy electron
diffraction, sandwich tunnel-junction spectroscopy, and field ion micros-
copy—all instrumental communities with poor records of commercializa-
tion. Later, STM and AFM attracted participants from many fields (such as
surface science, biophysics, mineralogy, electrochemistry, and polymer sci-
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ence, some of which were more commercialized than others) who aided
groups such as Quate’s and Hansma’s in their gray-market activities.
Instrumental communities in which the cultural map is not conducive to
profit-making nonetheless provide the infrastructure and knowledge/labor
pool for communities in which the profit motive may be enormous. Policy-
makers cannot predict which communities will generate profits, and will
hinder all if they try to encourage only profitable ones at the expense of the
rest. Therefore policy-makers may be best advised to encourage professors
to foster gray markets within their instrumental communities, whether as
consumers, producers, or both. Gray-market activities such as exchanging
research materials, personnel, and components of technologies enlarge the
perspective of academic research. By focusing on the wider instrumental
community that surrounds a technology, it is seen that the university may
actually be more influential in maintaining a pool of skeptical, independ-
ent consumers who can threaten startups by the prospect of making their
own tools or even founding their own firms.
Finally, both opponents and supporters of corporate involvement in
academia have seized on grains of truth. Supporters have it right that cor-
porate–academic linkages are desirable, even necessary, for research and
innovation. There was no golden age in which faculty operated independ-
ently of commerce, pursuing disinterested research. Knowledge-produc-
tion in physics, engineering, and chemistry was always aided by academic
consulting and the exchanging of personnel and ideas. The oft-criticized
commercialism of the “biotech revolution” merely extended long-standing
entrepreneurial practices into molecular biology. The STM and AFM case
study does, however, provide reason for opposing the notion that universi-
ties should be operated as businesses, seeking profit where they might and
run along the “rational” lines of modern management. The probe-micro-
scopy community developed rapidly because participants could point to
different institutional poles: corporations, universities, and national labo-
ratories. Sometimes innovation occurred because these poles were
opposed, as when Hansma and Quate shifted from surface science and
UHV STM to new designs and applications; at other times, innovation
occurred because participants created hybrid forms between these poles:
the gray market of software trading, the CSS STM, and the so-called toy
business. Instrumental communities rely on a variety of actors who are part
of different kinds of institutions. If all these institutions are operated on the
same highly managed, profit-driven model, then the exchange of people
and ideas and the production of new technologies will likely be hindered.
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